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Adrian Vanzyl

Why the Best Exit Isn’t Always the Biggest One, According to Adrian Vanzyl

Most conversations about startup exits focus on one number: the headline valuation. Adrian Vanzyl thinks that focus is misplaced. After decades spent investing in and advising technology companies, he’s watched founders chase the biggest possible number and later regret it. He’s also watched founders take a smaller deal and end up far better off. The difference rarely comes down to price alone.

This isn’t an argument against maximizing value. Instead, it’s an argument for defining value correctly in the first place.

Why Headline Numbers Hide the Real Terms

A big acquisition number attracts headlines. However, it rarely tells the full story. Earn-outs, escrow provisions, retention requirements, and equity-versus-cash splits can all quietly change what a deal is actually worth. In practice, a ten million dollar deal paid entirely in cash at close can be worth more than a fifteen million dollar deal loaded with contingencies that may never fully pay out.

This matters because founders under pressure to close a deal often focus on the top-line figure first. The structure gets negotiated second, and often with less scrutiny. As a result, this happens right when careful attention would matter most.

The Overlooked Cost of the Wrong Acquirer

Price is only one variable in an exit. Fit matters just as much, even though it’s harder to quantify. An acquirer who genuinely values the team, the product, and the culture tends to integrate well. That kind of acquirer preserves what made the company work in the first place. By contrast, an acquirer chasing the deal for defensive reasons, or simply to remove a competitor, behaves very differently. Often, the acquired team and product quietly wither within a year or two.

Founders sometimes discover this too late. The acquirer’s real intentions become clear through action, not through promises made during negotiation. A slightly lower offer from a genuinely committed acquirer often produces a far better outcome. That’s compared to a higher offer from one that isn’t.

Why Timing Can Matter More Than Price

Selling too early leaves value on the table. On the other hand, selling too late risks missing a window that may not reopen. Both mistakes are common. Neither is easy to diagnose in the moment, since the right timing only becomes obvious in hindsight.

A useful discipline is separating the emotional pull of a big number from an honest read of the company’s trajectory. Consider a high offer that arrives while momentum is genuinely accelerating. That offer deserves serious scrutiny before acceptance. By contrast, the same offer arriving after growth has already started to plateau deserves very different consideration. After all, it may represent the best price the company will ever see again.

The Founders and Employees Who Get Forgotten in the Structure

Exit negotiations tend to concentrate attention on the founders and the largest shareholders. Early employees often took on real risk for below-market compensation. Yet they can get treated as an afterthought in the final structure. This isn’t usually malicious. Rather, it’s simply where the negotiating leverage sits by the time a deal reaches the table.

However, how a company treats its early team during an exit says something durable about its founders. Word travels through a startup ecosystem quickly. A founder known for taking care of early employees builds a reputation that pays off in the next company they start. Meanwhile, a founder known for the opposite carries that reputation forward too.

What Adrian Vanzyl Says a Good Exit Actually Optimizes For

A good exit balances several things at once. These include fair value, an acquirer genuinely equipped to carry the work forward, defensible terms for the people who built the company, and timing that reflects the business’s real trajectory rather than short-term market noise. Optimizing for headline price alone, at the expense of the other three, tends to produce a specific pattern. The outcome looks good in a press release and feels disappointing in practice a year later.

This is a difficult balance to strike under pressure, especially when a founder has spent years building toward this single moment and understandably wants it to feel unambiguously like a win.

What This Means for Founders Approaching an Exit

For founders weighing a potential exit, the practical lesson is to slow down exactly when the instinct is to move fast. Scrutinize the deal structure as carefully as the headline number. Evaluate the acquirer’s real intentions, not just their stated ones. Consider the people who helped build the company, not only the largest shareholders at the table.

That’s the standard Adrian Vanzyl encourages founders to hold themselves to. It applies even when a tempting number is sitting right in front of them.

What Makes a Good Board Member? Adrian Vanzyl Explains

Most advice about startup boards focuses on how to build one. Far less gets said about how to actually serve on one well. Adrian Vanzyl has sat on both sides of that table. As a founder, he’s answered to a board. He’s also sat on the other side of it, as an investor. That dual view shapes a clear opinion: most board members add far less value than they think they do.

This isn’t a cynical take. Instead, it’s a practical one. Once you’ve been on both sides, certain patterns become impossible to miss.

Why Most Board Advice Sounds Right and Isn’t

Board members often deliver advice shaped by secondhand information. They read the deck. They skim the metrics. Then, they offer confident opinions based on a partial picture. This isn’t malicious. However, it’s a structural problem. After all, a board member who visits once a quarter simply doesn’t have the context a founder has every single day.

As a result, the most common failure mode isn’t bad intentions. Rather, it’s overconfidence built on thin information. For instance, a board member who suggests cutting a specific team, or pivoting a specific channel, may sound decisive. Yet without real operating context, that advice can be actively harmful.

The Difference Between Governance and Meddling

Good board membership starts with a clear boundary. On one hand, governance means asking hard questions and stress-testing assumptions. It also means holding a founder accountable to their own stated goals. On the other hand, meddling means trying to run the company from the boardroom, one layer removed from the consequences.

Adrian Vanzyl draws this line carefully. A board’s job is not to make operating decisions. Rather, it’s to make sure the founder is making good ones. It’s also about catching blind spots before they become expensive. That distinction sounds simple. In practice, though, it’s easy to violate. This is especially true for board members who were once operators themselves and miss being in the weeds.

Why Availability Matters More Than Expertise

Plenty of board members are recruited for their expertise. Fewer are chosen for their availability. Yet availability often matters more. Consider a brilliant board member who’s impossible to reach during a crisis. In practice, they provide less real value than an average one who picks up the phone immediately.

This matters because the moments that define a board relationship rarely happen in the quarterly meeting. Instead, they happen in an unscheduled call about a co-founder conflict. Sometimes it’s a term sheet that needs a same-day read. Other times, it’s a crisis that can’t wait three months for the next scheduled session. Either way, board members who show up for those moments earn a different kind of trust. That’s compared to ones who only show up on the calendar.

What Founders Should Actually Want From a Board Member

Founders often default to wanting board members with the most impressive resume. That’s understandable. However, it’s frequently the wrong priority. A more useful question is simpler: will this board member tell you something you don’t want to hear? Just as importantly, will they do it early enough to matter?

Board members who avoid conflict to preserve a comfortable relationship aren’t doing their job. This holds true even if the relationship feels pleasant. Instead, the board members worth having are willing to raise an uncomfortable point in month three. That’s far better than a devastating one surfacing in month eighteen.

How Adrian Vanzyl Evaluates His Own Value on a Board

Adrian Vanzyl applies a simple test to his own board work. Specifically, he asks whether the founder would be meaningfully worse off without him in the room. If the honest answer is no, that’s a signal. Either he needs to change how he’s engaging, or he should step back entirely. Notably, board seats accumulated for prestige rather than genuine usefulness tend to become dead weight. This applies to everyone involved, including the investor holding them.

This self-check matters because board seats are easy to collect and hard to actively work. Consider an investor with a dozen board seats and limited bandwidth per company. In that case, they’re optimizing for portfolio breadth, not for the depth any single founder actually needs.

The Long-Term Cost of a Passive Board

A disengaged board doesn’t just fail to help. In fact, it actively creates risk. Founders operating without real board engagement often go too long without external challenge to their own assumptions. As a result, small strategic mistakes compound quietly. Nobody with real standing raised a flag early enough to matter.

By contrast, an engaged board catches these issues while they’re still cheap to fix. This isn’t about control. Rather, it’s about having someone in the room who owes the founder honesty instead of comfort. It’s also about paying close enough attention to notice when something’s drifting off course.

What This Means for Founders Building Their Board

If there’s one practical takeaway here, it’s this: choose board members for engagement and honesty first, credentials second. Picture a well-known name who shows up once a quarter and says pleasant things. By comparison, a less prestigious board member who calls back within the hour and tells hard truths is worth far more.

That’s the standard Adrian Vanzyl holds himself to. It’s also the standard he encourages founders to demand from everyone else sitting around their table.